Summary. This paper views uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. The most important Endogenous Uncertainty examined in this paper is price uncertainty which arises when agents do not have structural knowledge and are compelled to make decisions on the basis of their beliefs. We assume that agents adopt Rational Beliefs as in Kurz [1994a]. The trading of endogenous uncertainty is accomplished by using Price Contingent Contracts (PCC) rather than the Arrow-Debreu state contingent contracts. The paper provides a full construction of the "price state space" which requires the expansion of the exogenous state space to include the "state of beliefs." This construction is central to the analysis of equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty and the paper provides an existence theorem for a Rational Belief Equilibrium with PCC. It shows how the PCC completes the markets for trading endogenous uncertainty and lead to an allocation which is Pareto optimal. The paper also demonstrates that endogenous uncertainty is generically present in this new equilibrium.
elevate the concept of the state to even more crucial role. In the formulation of the equilibrium they adopt the rational expectations hypothesis (which has also been called the conditional perfect foresight hypothesis) where agents are assumed to know at each date the map between future realized states and future equilibrium commodity and asset prices. Thus, in such an equilibrium with securities the realized state must resolve all individual uncertainty including the uncertainty of future prices.
It is widely recognized that this exogenous and objective concept of the state which is
The Arrow-Debreu state space has been useful only for insurance markets. However, in this case 4 Malinvaud [1972] [1973] showed that since these markets handle only individual, idiosyncratic risks, the diversification achieved through such markets imply that these individual risks are of little relevance to general equilibrium considerations. The main allocation problem which general equilibrium theory must address is then the allocation of social risks; these risks are represented mostly by the fluctuations of economic variables over time. 3 common to all agents, has empirical content only for insurance markets. An exogenous state which 4 is observable and common to all agents cannot resolve most uncertainties. On the other hand, a state which expresses all individual uncertainties consists mostly of unobservable and incomparable components. Arrow [1953] himself explicitly recognized this when explaining that markets for exogenously specified state-contingent commodity claims do not exist and therefore we must consider securities as the main vehicles for reallocating social uncertainty. However, for the exogenous state to be a useful tool for the pricing of securities agents need to know the maps from states at future dates to prices in the future and it is entirely unrealistic to assume that agents can find out what this sequence of maps is. It is then clear that the construction of an exogenous state, common to all agents, serves as a convenient mathematical device which enables an Arrow-Debreu theory to formally incorporate the complex phenomenon of uncertainty by merely relabeling commodities.
As a useful mathematical device, the exogenous state space together with the rational expectations hypothesis in the sense of Arrow [1953] have enabled extremely important developments in the fields of general equilibrium theory and finance. With the view of extending this theory further we note that the arguments against this approach are both empirical as well as theoretical.
On the empirical side we know that markets for state contingent contracts rarely exist and the exogenous "state" is hardly describable. On the other hand, an extensive array of price contingent contracts (to be called "PCC" in this paper) are traded by agents for hedging risks. Such contracts are obviously traded daily in large volume on major financial markets across the world.
Moreover, such instruments play an essential role in the ordinary conduct of business. A few examples will illustrate the point. Real estate developers and natural resource companies use options and other PCC as hedging devices in their planning of major projects. Purchasers of large scale plant and equipment such as aircrafts and gas pipelines use PCC as a normal device for handling the risk of fluctuating demand. Even owners of sport clubs use options in any labor contract to assure themselves the continuity of service without price risk. The use of PCC to trade price uncertainty is the consequence of the fact that agents do not know the Arrow [1953] maps from exogenous states to future prices. In such a framework concepts of "complete" and "incomplete" markets is devoid of empirical content since there is no empirical way of determining if a market is complete or not.
In fact, the presumption should be that markets are always "complete" since under the assumptions of Arrow [1953] agents know the map from states to prices and consequently can always add enough "derivative" securities to complete the markets. This observation is due to Ross [1976] . Also, when the market structure is complete "derivative" securities are "redundant" (see Hakansson [1978] ).
All the above are critically central issues to a general equilibrium theory with securities.
They are, however, of minor importance relative to our major theoretical argument against the Arrow [1953] and Arrow-Debreu [1954] state space and rational expectations with securities.
The central issue at stake is the nature of uncertainty in economic systems. The Arrow [1953] and Arrow-Debreu [1954] formalism which was adopted by all subsequent developments, views all uncertainty in the economy as being generated by forces which are external to the economic system. In a temporal context uncertainty is mostly represented by the potential fluctuations of economic variables. Hence, according to this theory the fluctuations of asset prices, GNP or foreign exchange rates are all ultimately explainable by exogenous factors such as the weather, earthquakes, etc. Equally objectionable is the view that nothing that agents do or think has any impact on the fluctuations of economic variables.
It is our firm view that most of the uncertainty in an advanced industrial society arises from internally propagated fluctuations which are generated by the actions and beliefs of the agents about the nature of the market and by their uncertainty about the actions of other agents. This component of uncertainty was introduced by Kurz [1974a] who also introduced the term Endogenous Uncertainty to describe it. Such uncertainty obviously cannot arise in an Arrow [1953] context with rational expectations. Our model recognizes the fact that agents do not know the structural relationships between exogenous states and optimal actions of other agents or between these states and prices. In such circumstances agents are uncertain about future prices and Kurz [1974a] proposed that agents trade this uncertainty using PCC such as options. In such an economy PCC are not "redundant" in any sense: they are the primary vehicles to trade price uncertainty. These ideas were further developed by Svensson [1981] , Henrotte [1996] and Kurz [1995] . Pivotal to this approach is the existence of diversity of beliefs among the trading agents.
The central outlook of the endogenous uncertainty approach is to view uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. It is therefore clear that the development of this approach must be based on two elements. The first is an integration of a new theory of expectations and beliefs which is compatible with the diversity of beliefs among agents. The second is a comprehensive study of financial institutions such as PCC 6 which enable the trading of and reallocation of endogenous uncertainty. Our approach clearly recognizes the importance of exogenous variables for equilibrium analysis. However, we define the price state space to include the states of beliefs as well as other endogenous variables such as prices or profits of firms. Such an economy contains the Arrow-Debreu economy as a special case when there is no endogenous uncertainty. In this paper we want to highlight the importance of the "state of beliefs" and therefore will exclude from the price state space other endogenous variables. We postpone to later papers the analysis of more complex price state spaces. This paper aims to develop an equilibrium theory with endogenous uncertainty in a one commodity overlapping-generations (OLG) context and explore the role of price-contingent contracts in the allocation of risk. Our model has three components. First, agents are assumed to have Rational Beliefs (see Kurz [1994a] [1994b] [1995] [1996]) which include rational expectation as a special case. The second component of our model is the explicit introduction of a "price state space" and of price contingent contracts. In contrast with the Arrow [1953] and Radner [1972] framework where knowledge of the exogenous state carries with it the complex information needed to determine prices, our price state space is either a set of integers {1, 2, ..., M} in the case of finite prices or the unit interval in the case of continuum of prices. Thus, prices are themselves the state variables. On the other hand, PCC are contracts that specify a delivery of commodities or securities at a future date and such deliveries are contingent on the prices which will be realized at that future date.
The third component of our model is the sequential structure where markets reopen at each date. Since agents are assumed to hold Rational Beliefs the equilibrium concept employed here is a Rational Belief Equilibrium introduced by Kurz [1994b . In these two papers agents are infinitely lived but are not allowed to trade PCC. The novelty of the present paper is that here agents can trade PCC and the framework is an OLG model. This structure with a single consumable commodity and a single productive activity is a drastic simplification. It does enable us, however, to highlight some of the essential features of this new approach to dynamic equilibrium analysis.
II. The Model and the Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) Concept (II.a) The Basic Model
We use a standard OLG model with K young agents in each generation which we denote by k = 1 , 2 , ... , K. There are also K old agents in each generation but only the young receive an endowment T , t = 1 , 2 , .... For each k {T , t = 1 , 2 , ...} is a stochastic process which will be t t k k specified below. Each young person is a replica of the old person who preceded him where the term "replica" refers to the utilities and beliefs. This is a model of "dynasties" and the simplifying assumption made here is that there is a finite number of such dynasties. In addition to the market for commodities traded in each period, two types of financial assets are included. One is the common stock of a firm and at date 1 the supply (equals to 1) of the stock is distributed among the old. This distribution initiates the financial sector and ultimately ensures intergenerational efficiency. The second asset class is a PCC which enables an agent to contract for the delivery of a unit of the common stock at future dates contingent upon the prices which prevail at these future dates rather than upon some abstract "states" which are realized.
The infinitely lived firm is assumed to be extremely simple: it generates exogenously a deterministic sequence { R , t = 1 , 2 , ...} of dividend payments. This production uses no resources t and in most of the development we shall assume that R = R > 0. The PCC developed in Svensson t
[1981], Henrotte [1996] and Kurz [1995] enables agents to contract for the future delivery of commodities and securities in a setting with multiple commodities and securities. However, it is
immediate that conditions of "no arbitrage" imply that the only factor that matters is the ability of agents to transfer purchasing power across time rather than any specific commodities or securities.
We shall therefore specify that the PCC below permit an agent to contract for the future delivery of the shares of the firm. Naturally, the price of such insurance could be so prohibitive that an agent may elect not to be fully insured. We stress that the only uncertainty faced by the agents is the uncertainty about the price of the stock and under our assumptions the market is "complete" when this term means that there is a feasible way of trading all price uncertainty in the second period.
In our model endowment is random but this uncertainty raises some interesting questions.
Since this uncertainty exists before the agents are born and since at "birth" they are told what T t k is, this ex-post variability of the endowment is a useful tool of analysis. We could reallocate this uncertainty by assuming that each agent is born with a PCC and consequently the uncertainty would be shifted to the old agents. We see no advantage in such a device since both observability and incentives make it impossible to directly trade the uncertainty of individual endowments and our concern in this paper is the market mechanism for allocation of risk.
The notation we employ in this paper is as follows:
x -the consumption of k when young at t;
$ t (p t % 1 ) dp t % 1 .
10 the conditions of rationality of beliefs, the price state space could be made to consist of only a finite number of elements thus dispensing with most of the technical problems mentioned above. Also, in the case when {R , t = 1, 2, ...} is a random process, issues of incentives make it impossible to t trade at date t the uncertainty of R . That is, since in the real economy management decisions t+1 induce the stochastic process {R , t = 1, 2, ...} such incentives would be affected by the ability of t managers to bet on the outcome of their own decisions. The ability to trade common stocks has some element of these same incentive problems, but to a much lesser extent and even then substantial public regulations have been instituted to prevent the distortions of such incentive effects.
As a modeling strategy we assume that all PCC can be traded but do not permit the trading of contracts which are contingent on the profits of the firm. Our previously specified assumption of R = R is then justified by the desire for simplification. It also ensures that each generation will t have a complete set of markets to trade uncertainty. 
In the development below we require that the price vectors satisfy (3).
(II.b) Rational Belief Equilibria of the OLG Model with Price-Contingent Contracts
Our development here follows Kurz [1994a] and [1994b] . Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) requires market clearance. Thus, we say that markets clear at all dates if, for all histories
If follows from (2a) - (2b) and (4a) - (4b) that when markets clear then
where x , x and T are the aggregates defined by
The non-arbitrage condition (3) and a natural normalization are both used in the selection of an appropriate price space S for v = (p , p ) . We need such a space to be a compact subset of a v t t t c complete and separable metric space and then is a measurable space where Û(@) denotes the Borel F-field of the space in question.
To define a Rational Belief Equilibrium let (x , x , 2 , z , t = 1 , 2 , ...) be a sequence of
optimal decision functions which are maps from histories to actions for k = 1 , 2 , ..., K. These functions induce a market clearing process of prices over the space and an associated sequence of functions ( $ , t = 1, 2, ...). One of the objectives
of this paper is to show how the rationality of belief conditions enable us to work with a space with finite number of elements. Note the crucial observation that the market clearing probability A was induced by the beliefs (Q , Q ,..., Q ) of the K dynasties (represented earlier by the 1 2 k conditional densities (f , f ,..., f )). In a RBE we have the dual property that A is induced by (Q   1  2  k  1 , Q ,..., Q ) and each one of the Q is a Rational Belief relative to A (as in Kurz [1994a] [1994b]). there is a procedure for selecting a particular one of them which, in turn, generates the data observed in the economy. This, indirectly, addresses also the issue of sunspot equilibria. Such equilibria require a device for alternating random selections from among multiple equilibria of some underlying economy over time. If such an equilibrium is to be realized then this selection must be part of the description of the dynamical system. Moreover, a formal coordination among agents is feasible only if one of the observable exogenous variables provides the needed signal for joint action and then we must interpret the fluctuations of the economy which are due to the commonly observed
sunspot variable as exogenously caused. In an RBE where an exogenous sunspot signal it not present, it is possible that the agents form beliefs which will vary over time and would, in a spontaneous way, be perfectly coordinated. In this narrow sense, a sunspot equilibrium can be realized as an RBE but is a most unlikely equilibrium.
Given the definition of an RBE the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section III works out a simple example which demonstrates how the price state space of an RBE is constructed and why the rationality conditions allow us to work with a finite state space. Our use of the rationality conditions in the construction of the price state space may be contrasted with the treatment in Svensson [1981] , Henrotte [1996] and Kurz [1993] who do not use any rationality conditions and end up needing to work with a space of the order of the continuum. The section also provides a definition of the important concept of Endogenous Uncertainty. Section IV provides a proof of the existence of an RBE with PCC for the family of SIDS processes developed by Nielsen [1994] . The proof demonstrates how the PCC "complete" the market for trading endogenous uncertainty for every generation once the endowment of the young is known. Section V discusses the Pareto optimality properties of the equilibrium and the role of the PCC in the optimality properties.
III. Endogenous Uncertainty and Rational Beliefs
The study of RBE in full generality entails complex technical difficulties but the properties of the state space and endogenous uncertainty become very clear even in simple models.
Consequently, this section will be devoted to explore a special case where four simplifications are made:
(iii) (T , T ) can take only two values T = (T , T ) and T = (T , T ),
In order to avoid issues of price normalization we use the term "price" in this section to 
For example, we select
Denote by A the probability of the stochastic process {T , t = 1 , 2 , ...} given {D, V}. This non-T t stationary process is an example of an SIDS process studied by Nielsen [1994] , [1996] . It follows from Nielsen [1996] that it is stable and has a stationary measure m defined by the i.i.d. process
where the probability of (T , T ) is ½. This is so since 1H 2H
We stress its non-stationary character in comparison with by noting that one must interpret the true process as a composition of a selection rule of dates in D or V together with the probabilities which apply in D or in V. Thus, if you were to bet at t on the outcome at t + 1 then the knowledge of A will lead you to bet differently at different dates. This .
Note that at any moment of time agent 2 believes that any of the four prices may be realized except that he does not believe that the distribution is stationary. To formulate his belief on infinite sequences of prices he selects first a rule of partitioning the integers into {D , V } in a manner 1 1 similar to the rule of selecting {D , V} so that on any infinite set {t ,t + 1 , t + 2 , ...} the proportions are He then selects at date t the probabilities representing his belief about prices at date t + 1 according to the following rule:
We denote by Q the Rational Belief specified above on the space of infinite price sequences.
In summary, the four price states of the model may be thought of in the following manner We stress the fact that one may only think about the states in this manner for two reasons. First, neither T nor f are observable and from the point of view of the agents there are simply four H t prices that may be observed. Second, the interpretation of the "price state" depends upon the structure of information given to the agents. The assumption of non-structural knowledge by the agents is central to our work. It means that agents know that in equilibrium there are only four possible prices without the knowledge of the structure which induces these states. We use this simple structure because it is analytically convenient. However, agents are required to disregard their individual impact on the structure.
More specifically, agent type 2, whose belief induces some of the variability of prices, is assumed to be "competitive" or "small" and is therefore specifically prohibited from knowing how his own belief structure contributes to the nature of uncertainty of future prices. In a model where the endowment T may take any random value in a subset of ß , where the dividend process R may t + k n t take any value in a compact interval and where the number of agents is very large, the assumption that each agent is "competitive" is then naturally made and would hardly be questioned.
We now turn to the specification of the restrictions of rationality on the beliefs of a type 2 agent. This agent selects f = f with frequency when t + 1 , D and f = f with 
To calculate the µ consider, for example, µ . It is generated when T = T and f = f . The event We thus have 5 independent equations with 8 unknowns implying 3 degrees of freedom which indicate the size or the dimension of indeterminacy leading to multiple RBE.
Although we assumed that agents cannot observe the aggregate endowment relaxing this assumption would have made no difference to the calculations of the stationary measure. The reason is that an inspection of (11) reveals that when t + 1 , D the agent believes (at t ) that the event {p 1 1 or p } occurs with probability (a + a ) and this is also the probability of the event {T = T }. Since this knowledge requires that
The on the right hand side of (13) by m and is defined by the i.i.d. process with density µ at each date. We present in the table below an example of the three probability measures of our example. A is the true probability; Q 1 = m is the belief of agent type 1 and Q = Q is the belief of agent type 2. 
We now turn to the definition of the crucial concept of "Endogenous Uncertainty." As is clear from the description of the state spaces S and S we have that In this case the four price states are reduced to two and there is no endogenous uncertainty: all the stochastic variability of prices is entirely caused by stochastic variations in the exogenous variables.
To formally define the concept of Endogenous Uncertainty we need to take into account the variability of g , the true probabilities of the exogenous variables. Note first that these probabilities T are known in a rational expectations equilibrium but not in an RBE. As a result, prices in a rational expectations equilibrium vary when g varies but this is not the case in an RBE. To enable a T distinction between these two equilibrium concepts we define the pair (g , s) as the extended state 
T T
Endogenous Uncertainty thus arises when the beliefs of agents influence equilibrium prices when the true probability of the exogenous variables remains the same. This allows for the possibility that an RBE is a rational expectations equilibrium and the definition stipulates that Endogenous
Uncertainty cannot be present in a rational expectations equilibrium. That is, suppose that at two different dates the exogenous variables have the same realized T but different true probabilities of future values of the exogenous variables. Under rational expectations agents know that the true probabilities are different and hence prices will be different but this variability, according to our definition, does not constitute endogenous uncertainty.
(III.b) When the Utility Function is Logarithmic Endogenous Uncertainty is Not Present
The first order conditions require that the decision functions depend upon
all variables (p , p , $ (·) , T ) . In writing x we suppress this dependence but in writing x (j) (17) Equation (17) shows that although there is no Endogenous Uncertainty in the model, the beliefs of the agents influence the allocation. Adding (17) over k reveals the equilibrium function $,
It is seen in (19) that the price of a PCC is exactly what one can call the market belief: it is the weighted average of the probabilities of the agents when their relative endowments provide the weights. We can then conclude as follows:
) .
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Proposition 1: When u (x, y) = log x + log y , all k, there is no Endogenous Uncertainty in any RBE.
k (III.c) Endogenous Uncertainty is Generally Present in a RBE
The logarithmic utility function is borderline case when future perceived investment opportunities have no effect on current consumption and consequently price expectations have no effect on current consumption. For any other utility function the diversity of beliefs in an RBE gives rise to Endogenous Uncertainty. To illustrate, consider an alternative case where for all k Since by (5a) p x = p T -p it follows that t t t c 1 c
This approach was proposed by Nielsen [1994] , [1996] who proves existence in economies where PCC 5 are not traded.
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T = T or T = T . However, it is also different depending upon whether t + 1 , D or t t H L 1 t + 1 , V since the price expectations of agent type 2 are different in these two cases.
1
The price of a PCC still reflects the "market belief" but here the weights are different. This follows from the fact that (20a) and (20c) imply that (23) This example shows that resource allocations of an agent with non -logarithmic utility function is sensitive to his beliefs and in equilibrium it will, generally, translate into endogenous uncertainty.
IV. Rational Belief Equilibrium with PCC and Endogenous Uncertainty
This section demonstrates the existence of an RBE for the economy of Sections II and III.
An existence theorem requires not only a proof of the existence of market clearing prices but also a demonstration that agents hold rational beliefs and that equilibrium quantities and prices constitute a stable dynamical system. Anticipating the stability requirement we carry out the analysis in two stages. In the first stage we construct the price state space by selecting the probability of the endowment process and the probability beliefs of the agents to be jointly SIDS measures since it follows from Nielsen [1996] that this induces stable equilibrium system. Such an SIDS system generalizes the example of Section III. In the second stage we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and quantities for the specified systems.
(IV.a) The Structure of Uncertainty and Beliefs
We return to the model of Section II. The process is a
25 stochastic process on the exogenous state space S where (T , T , ..., T ) is the endowment
vector of the K young agents. This defines a dynamical system The assumption which we make here and which will then lead to the postulated SIDS system is:
Assumption 1: The process , T , ß , takes only a finite number of values in the t K set of N elements. Moreover, A is an SIDS probability measure under 0 T which is an independent sequence of random variables.
Assumption 1 implies that we can define the exogenous state space S by the coordinates. Hence T
We next introduce the beliefs of the agents which are probabilities Q , k = 1, 2, ..., K on a k measurable space where S -the price state space -is a Borel subset yet to be defined. sequence of independent random variables with date t probability on (S , Û(S )) denoted by f .
This probability is selected from a finite set of such probabilities with N k members.
The important implication of Assumptions 1 and 2 is that we can derive from conditions (4a) -(4b) an equilibrium map which takes the form (25) .
Inspection of (25) reveals that under Assumptions 1 and 2 the maximal number of prices that can be observed is This leads to the conclusion that the price state space, which is the domain of the price process, can be defined by (26) S = {1 , 2 ,..., M} .
p Given the finite state spaces of the endowment process and the beliefs of the agents we want to
26 specify the selection process { , t = 1, 2, ...} to be jointly stable. Formally, note that in view of the equilibrium map (25) it follows that we can think of the exogenous state space S as a partition of the price state space S as explained in (14) and this implies that we can think of We remark that Assumptions 1 and 3 are essentially assumptions about the stochastic process { , t = 1, 2, ...} which is called a "generating process" and is the driving mechanism of an SIDS process (see Nielsen [1996] Sections 4-5 ).
The joint SIDS property of the endowment and the beliefs of the agents is central to our existence argument since a proof of the existence of an RBE requires a demonstration that all market clearing variables constitute a stable process and the beliefs of the agents are rational with respect to the probability of the equilibrium process. An SIDS system is "self referential" or "closed" in the precise sense that if Assumptions 1, 2, 3 are satisfied then equilibrium prices are also SIDS and for each exogenous process there exist SIDS beliefs which are rational with respect to the resulting equilibrium. Moreover, for each dynamical system the equilibrium dynamics of prices and the rationality conditions on the beliefs (Q , Q ,..., Q ) are all specified in 1 2 K terms of the dynamical system of price states without specifying the numerical values of equilibrium prices. Also, the stationary measure of the equilibrium stochastic process of prices is independent of the particular sequence which is realized; it depends only on the generating process itself. This self-referential property, which is a substitute for a fixed point argument, has been extended by Kurz and Schneider [1996] to subclasses of Markov processes.
To complete the development we need to ensure that we have a consistent price state space in the sense that for each endowment process there is a map (25), an SIDS equilibrium price process and SIDS beliefs Q for all k such that the beliefs are rational with respect to the equilibrium
{1, 2, ..., N k } k ' 0,1,2,...,K . established as yet, the implication of Lemma 1 is that we must think of a "price state" as exactly such a vector. In other words, in an RBE an agent does not think of some abstract and unobservable "state" and then considers equilibrium prices to be measurable functions on this state space. Instead, he thinks of vectors of prices as states over which he places his probability beliefs. Equally important, the PCC contracts used to trade uncertainty are not contingent upon an exogenously specified states but rather, on specific and observable price vectors ( , p ) that may be realized next i period. In the present paper, where we assume a complete set of PCC at each date, the two-stage procedure of our proof has the implication that standard techniques of Arrow-Debreu theory can be used to prove the existence of an RBE despite the new financial structure which we postulate.
We return to the problem (1) - (2) 
We observe now that the assumed complete PCC structure permits hedging, at date t, of all period t+1 risks which are compatible with a single budget constraint. This makes it feasible to select riskless consumption streams. To show that all pairs of periods t and t +1 consumption are feasible if they satisfy a single income constraint when young, substitute (30) into (31a) and set to obtain one intertemporal budget constraint for the two vectors of consumption and for each i = 1, ..., M
Hence we have in (32) a single budget constraint relative to which it is feasible to choose at each state i a riskless (i.e. constant ) consumption stream.
The budget equations ( In (33) we use the symbol to identify the consumption of the old at date 1 and state j. Equation (33) reveals that although the young at any date can think of (32) as their effective constraint this is not the case for the old at date 1. This is a direct consequence of the OLG structure of the model which we need to keep in mind in establishing the existence of an RBE. We now introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4: For each k, the utility function u is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly k monotonic.
The utility function in (1) can then be written for a given belief as The budget correspondence of young traders in state i is then written, for k = 1, 2, ...,K as
It is important to note that the budget correspondence (35a) depends upon the entire set of prices
q since in (31b) the agent needs to ensure non-negative consumption in all states. That is, at each price state i the agent plans his old age consumption at all possible price states j and hence it depends upon the entire price vector p = (p , p , ..., p ) . By the arbitrage free conditions (30) the 1 2 M vector p is a linear function of all the elements in $.
The budget correspondence of old traders k = 1, 2, ...,K at date 1 in state i is then
The following is then standard:
Lemma 2: The budget set correspondences of the young and the old are non-empty and for each q they are convex and compact valued, and continuous on the interior of .
In the following proof we encounter the usual problem where demand correspondences are not defined on the boundary when some prices equal to 0. We denote by Ú the real economy with which we work. We now introduce a sequence of economies Ú where for each n the economy n is bounded in a cube nW. The set W is a compact cube centered on the zero vector and all the original budget sets are then intersected with nW to create new budget sets which are then compact subsets of nW even when some prices equal 0. These budget correspondences are non-empty, convex and compact valued, and continuous at all price vectors in = . A construction of the economies Ú requires complex additional notation. Since this is a standard procedure we shall n avoid such added notation (for details on this procedure see Kurz [1974b, sections 6-7] ). Thus, when we say below that "a variable takes the value +n in Ú " we mean that it is on the boundary of the n restricted budget set of the agent in Ú .
n Turning to demand correspondences, for k = 1,...,K and i = 1,...,M the notation used for the young is
For old agents we use the notation . Now, define the demand
It then follows from the theorem of the maximum and from Lemma 2 that Lemma 3: The demand correspondences (n (q) , n (q)) for k = 1, 2, ...,K are non empty, convex k yk and compact valued, and upper hemicontinuous on . In each of the uniformly bounded economies Ú , the vector of demand correspondences (n (q) , n (q)) is non-empty, convex and n k yk compact valued, and upper hemicontinuous on the entire price space =.
(IV.b.2) Existence Proof
In the OLG economy at hand the market clearing conditions (5a)-(5b) stipulate that no matter what the state at date t -1 is, in an RBE the aggregate consumption of the young and the aggregate consumption of the old at date t has to add to the total supply. That is, the demand of the young at any date depends only upon the state at that date and hence this condition holds for all dates. Comparing with (37) we can conclude that in equilibrium holds at all dates. þ By Lemma 4 we rewrite (37) to require (38) for all i = 1, 2, ...,M.
Next, the financial markets must clear and since all PCC are in zero net supply we require that 
where with a strict inequality in (51) for some k at some date t. is some initial consumption for the old which may be set equal to 0 if the function is bounded. The (*) symbol indicates, as before, price ratio. The allocation is said to be Risk Allocation Pareto Optimal if, in addition, the alternative feasible allocation must satisfy (52) t= 1,2,... Comment: Restriction (52) aims to focus on the risk allocation of the sequence of markets and to avoid the intergenerational efficiency problem which is different in nature.
Theorem 2: An RBE with a complete structure of price contingent contracts is Pareto Optimal.
Proof: The proof of the Risk Allocation optimality of an RBE is standard. To see that, suppose that an RBE ( x , x , 2 , z ), t = 1,2,..., k = 1,...,K is not R.A P.O., then there exists a feasible allocation , k = 1,...,K such that with a strict inequality for some agent k.
Hence and with some inequality strict. Adding over k , using (52), the positivity of p and t c the definition of feasibility lead to contradicting the feasibility of
To prove that an RBE is Pareto Optimal we use Peled's [1982, Appendix] rather lengthy argument which we omit. It utilizes the observation that if the old are made better off at some date then the young of that date must be compensated at the following date. Since our RBE has a positive interest rate in all states, this compensation is positively compounded over time and after a finite number of steps in time the allocation becomes infeasible. þ
VI. Final Remarks
This paper integrates two main ideas. The first proposes that agents without structural knowledge adopt rational beliefs and second, that endogenous uncertainty is traded with PCC rather than with the Arrow-Debreu state contingent contracts. The result is a new equilibrium concept in which price uncertainty is treated by the optimizing agents in the same way in which they treat the traditional exogenous uncertainty. Moreover, equilibrium fluctuations of allocations and prices in the economy over time are partly endogenously propagated. The existence proof of an RBE is in the spirit of Arrow-Debreu theory and depends crucially upon the construction of the finite price state space which, in turn, results from the use of the rationality conditions. The importance of the
